Ownership Concentration, Firm Size, and Information Value Relevance: Indonesian Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Firm Value: Evidence from France
The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of the relationship between ownership structure of French firms and their value. Using data for 510 French publicly traded firms, the current study provides evidence in support of the entrenchment hypothesis. The results show that large controlling shareholders maintaining grip on control while holding only a small fraction of cash f...
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From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well, but not more likely to increase their ownership when their firms have poor performance. Because investors learn about the total change in managerial ownership w...
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The finance literature identifies two agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. First, there is a divergence-of-interests problem as management ownership falls. Second, there is an offsetting entrenchment problem when management ownership increases within intermediate regions of ownership. Agency problems are mitigated through contracting, but contracts are often based on accou...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Accounting and Investment
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2622-3899,2622-6413
DOI: 10.18196/jai.2002119