Overstraining international climate finance: when conflicts of objectives threaten its success

Purpose Climate finance is regularly not only seen as a tool to efficiently combat global warming but also solve development problems in the recipient countries and support attainment of sustainable goals. Thereby, conflicts between distributive allocative objectives arise, which threaten overall performance such transfer schemes. Given severity climate change problem, this study aims raise concerns about whether world can afford schemes that do focus on prevention (and adaptation to) might be considered vehicle rent-seeking by many agents. Design/methodology/approach Future designs international within framework Paris Agreement are based experience gained from existing mechanisms. Therefore, authors examine different using graphical technique first proposed David Pearce describe distributional goals arise. Findings In line with famous Tinbergen rule, argue other sustainability issues fairness should primarily addressed mainly tackled means. Research limitations/implications As there still ongoing, intense discussion how Article 6 designed, research will help sort some key arguments. Practical implications There prominent documents (like UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) seeking address simultaneously. While synergies policies desirable, major challenges policy coordination. Addressing several fewer instruments, example, succeed Rule points out. Social The integration co-benefits analysis allows taking into account social effects policy. argue, approaches could become overstrained if policymakers would consider them tools local problems. Originality/value paper, what learnt clean mechanism (CDM) future under observe experiences non-CDM scheme. So pay attention Trust Fund Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established benefit orientation, i.e. – unlike CDM it regarded an additional goal development. Yet, despite its disregard co-benefits, think particular importance include GEF analysis, important lessons it.