Overconfidence and Initial Public Offering (IPO) decisions: a behavioural corporate finance survey among polish managers

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Argumenta Oeconomica

سال: 2020

ISSN: 1233-5835

DOI: 10.15611/aoe.2020.1.10