Output hysteresis and optimal monetary policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We derive a fully quadratic approximation to welfare under endogenous growth and study optimal monetary policy. Away from the ZLB, commitment policy sets interest rates eliminate output hysteresis. A strict inflation targeting rule implements At is sub-optimal admits hysteresis, defined as permanent loss in potential output. new that targets hysteresis returns pre-shock trend approximates gains central bank unable commit future actions suffers bias: it does not offset past losses
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Monetary Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0304-3932', '1873-1295']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.06.005