Output and wages with inequality averse agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Are People Inequality-Averse, or Just Risk-Averse?
Individuals’ preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries. The median relative risk aversion, which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion, is between 2 and 3. Most people are also found to be individually inequality-averse, reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society. Left-wing voters and women are...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'<html_ent glyph="@eacute;" ascii="e"/>conomique
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0008-4085,1540-5982
DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00352.x