Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG) games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. An individual has no prior memory — that is, he does not directly witness the events that occur before his t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.263954