Organizational Coordination and Costly Communication with Boundedly Rational Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Organizational Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication
Prior experimental evidence finds decentralized pre-play communication to facilitate efficient coordination among interdependent agents. However, the kind of communication in these experiments is unrealistic for most organizational contexts, as it consists of costless messages from every agent, which are sent every time a coordination game is played. We study how communication use and its effec...
متن کاملAgent-based Modeling with Boundedly Rational Agents
This chapter introduces an agent-based modeling framework for reproducing micro behavior in economic experiments. It gives an overview of the theoretical concept which forms the foundation of the framework as well as short descriptions of two exemplary models based on experimental data. The heterogeneous agents are endowed with a number of attributes like cooperativeness and employ more or less...
متن کاملRepeated Moral Hazard with Boundedly Rational Agents
In this paper we consider a situation where a number of identical myopic agents enter a long term contract with a principal. The actions of the agents cannot be observed, and the principal ooers the agents a payment scheme where payments from the principal to the agents are based on the observable outcome in the corresponding period. Whereas the principal knows the distribution of outcomes, giv...
متن کاملCompetition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multidimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an increased effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing. As a result, consumer welfare is n...
متن کاملA Model of Boundedly Rational “Neuro” Agents
We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who mad...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2440622