Ordinal imitative dynamics

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agent in a population game imitates strategy of randomly chosen opponent whenever opponent’s realized payoff is higher than his or her own. Such behavior generates mean which depends order payoffs, but not their magnitudes, and polynomial utilization frequencies. We demonstrate that while does possess Nash stationarity monotonicity, under it pure strategies iteratively strictly dominated by are eliminated strict equilibria locally stable. investigate relationship between IBR rule replicator dynamics. In trivial cases, two topologically equivalent. Rock-Paper-Scissors games we conjecture both exhibit same types behavior, partitions set do coincide. other exhibits behaviors impossible

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics o...

متن کامل

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

We consider models of deterministic evolution in games with finite strategies in which populations of agents interact with themselves and with each other. All populations have a same set of strategies and an identical payoff function, but they differ in their imitative decision rules. We show that all the populations will have an identical distribution over strategies in the long run despite di...

متن کامل

Online Appendix to “Stochastic Imitative Game Dynamics with Committed Agents”

In this section, we consider stochastic evolution under two well-known imitative protocols: imitation of success and imitation driven by dissatisfaction. 1 Example O.1.1. Imitation of success. Suppose that when an agent receives a revision opportunity , he randomly samples an opponent, switching to the opponent's strategy with probability proportional to the difference between the opponent's pa...

متن کامل

Forbidden ordinal patterns in higher dimensional dynamics

Forbidden ordinal patterns are ordinal patterns (or ‘rank blocks’) that cannot appear in the orbits generated by a map taking values on a linearly ordered space, in which case we say that the map has forbidden patterns. Once a map has a forbidden pattern of a given length L0, it has forbidden patterns of any length L ≥ L0 and their number grows superexponentially with L. Using recent results on...

متن کامل

Imitative Reasoning

Taylor and Francis SEP_A_437580.sgm 10.1080/02691720903374026 Social Epistemology 0269-1728 (pri t)/1464-5297 (online) Original Article 2 0 & Francis 3 3/4 000July-December 200 Professor M amThalos m.th os@gm il.com On the classical instrumental view, practical reason is an all-things-considered enterprise, concerned not merely with identifying and evaluating appropriate means to the realizatio...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1432-1270', '0020-7276']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00797-7