Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferableand in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the avai...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002