OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION, AND DURATION DEPENDENCE
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Discussion Papers in Economics Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Human Capital Depreciation and Duration Dependence
This paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance (UI) scheme. Our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies: benefits should decrease with unemployment duration. The optimal program also generates two main novel features, which are not present in stationary models. First, if human capit...
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In this paper, I examine a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insurance. The introduction of capital into the economy of Wang and Williamson (2001) generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero. The result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance: both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise...
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We investigate the design of an optimal Unemployment Insurance program using an equilibrium search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources. We examine (a) the optimal potential duration of UI benefits, (b) the optimal UI replacement rate when the potential duration of benefits is optimal, and (c) the optimal UI replacement rate when...
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This paper studies the optimal joint design of disability insurance and unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard, when an individual’s health status is private information, taking into account cyclical fluctuations. I first show how disability benefits and unemployment benefits vary with aggregate economic conditions in an optimal contract that resolves this information proble...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00532.x