Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We investigate the design of an optimal Unemployment Insurance program using an equilibrium search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources. We examine (a) the optimal potential duration of UI benefits, (b) the optimal UI replacement rate when the potential duration of benefits is optimal, and (c) the optimal UI replacement rate when...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance
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The insurance function of federal budgets against regional asymmetric income shocksin scal federations is well known in the literature. Empirical studies provide estimates of the amount of stabilisation between the regions. Especially automatic stabilisers, like the unemployment insurance, show a large reaction to regional imbalances. The goal of this paper is to estimate the amount of redistri...
متن کاملFiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
In analyses of the optimal design of government programs, an important consideration is the extent to which a program can impact labour market outcomes. Typically, such analyses consider one government program in isolation, abstracting away from other roles of government, and thereby ignoring “fiscal externalities,” or the effects of the program’s labour market impacts on income tax revenues. T...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance and Cyclical Fluctuations
We study the design of optimal unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard and cyclical fluctuations. The optimal unemployment insurance contract balances the insurance motive to provide consumption for the unemployed with the provision of incentives to search for a job. This balance is affected by aggregate conditions, as recessions are characterized by reductions in job finding...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12287