منابع مشابه
Hypergeorgism: When rent taxation is socially optimal∗
Imperfect altruism between generations may lead to insufficient capital accumulation. We study the welfare consequences of taxing the rent on a fixed production factor, such as land, in combination with age-dependent redistributions as a remedy. Taxing rent enhances welfare by increasing capital investment. This holds for any tax rate and recycling of the tax revenues except for combinations of...
متن کاملInternal Rent-Seeking and Optimal Firm Size∗
This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of internal rent seeking. Since firm size has a discouragement effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both effects — together with technological considerations — determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large firm size. ...
متن کاملRent-Seeking and Innovation
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of in...
متن کاملInuencing rent-seeking contests
This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants e¤ort costs can lead to an increase in total e¤ort. In asymmetric settings, this levels the playing eldand therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total e¤ort may thus wish to make rent-seeking more di¢ cult. ...
متن کاملSequential rent seeking ∗
We consider n firms which choose rent-seeking expenditures sequentially, each player anticipating the rent-seeking expenditures that will be made by later movers. We find that the earlier movers need not make larger profits than later movers, and that aggregate profits are lower than in a game in which firms make simultaneous moves.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw017