Optimal taxation with consumption time as a leisure or labor substitute
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Labor Income Taxation∗
This handbook chapter reviews recent developments in the theory of optimal labor income taxation. We emphasize connections between theory and empirical work that were initially lacking from optimal income tax theory. First, we provide historical and international background on labor income taxation and means-tested transfers. Second, we present the simple model of optimal linear taxation. Third...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.002