Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance
What is the optimal amount of redistributive taxation and social insurance? A recent literature in public economics has come closer to providing quantitative answers to this central policy question. This literature has derived “sufficient statistic” formulas that map elasticities estimated in the modern program evaluation literature into predictions about optimal policies (e.g., Peter A. Diamon...
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This paper characterizes the welfare gains from government intervention when the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze models in which adverse selection, preexisting information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance markets create a role for government intervention. We derive simple formulas that map existing empirical estimates into quantitative predictions for optima...
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This paper characterizes the welfare gains from redistributive taxation and social insurance in an environment where the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze stylized models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance markets create a role for government intervention. We derive simple formulas that map reduced-form empiri...
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In this paper, we study optimal tax policy in a dynamic private information economy. We describe efficient allocations and competitive equilibria. The standard assumption in the literature is that trades are observable by all agents. We show that in such an environment the competitive equilibrium is efficient and that government consumption can be financed by lump-sum taxation. We go on to cons...
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We analyze the effect of heterogeneity on the widely used analyses of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) for optimal social insurance. The basic Baily-Chetty formula is robust to heterogeneity along many dimensions but requires that risk aversion be homogeneous. We extend the Baily-Chetty framework to allow for arbitrary heterogeneity across agents, particularly in risk preferences. We find that he...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1945-7731,1945-774X
DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.2.85