Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Optimal Social Choice Functions: A Utilitarian View
We adopt a utilitarian perspective on social choice, assuming that agents have (possibly latent) utility functions over some space of alternatives. For many reasons one might consider mechanisms, or social choice functions, that only have access to the ordinal rankings of alternatives by the individual agents rather than their utility functions. In this context, one possible objective for a soc...
متن کاملReasoning About Social Choice Functions
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., ...
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It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters' preferences is complete, the voters' preferences on alternatives induce voters' preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of ch...
متن کاملA proof-theoretic view on preference relations and choice functions
The paper develops a Gentzen-style framework for reasoning about basic notions of social choice theory as preference relations and choice functions. First, it aims at providing an inferentialist account of the meaning of such notions in terms of the inference rules governing their use in formal derivations: to this end it is shown how to formulate the axioms of preference relations (reflexivity...
متن کاملClaude Hillinger: Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting
In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2015.06.003