Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Robust Bilateral Trade and Mediated Bargaining∗
We consider bilateral trade problems subject to incomplete information on the reservation values of the agents. We address negotiations where the communication of proposals takes place though the filter of a third party, a mediator: traders submit proposals over continuous time to the mediator that receives bids and keeps them secret until they are compatible. A Robust regular equilibrium (RRE)...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008