Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Information Revelation with Uninformed Receiver
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2913