Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the strategic use of quality scores in keyword auctions: Full extraction of advertisers’ surplus
This paper shows that the quality scores in keyword auctions can be strategically chosen to extract all the advertisers’ surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders’ valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition. JEL classifications: D44; M37
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1649