Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Limits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects
A natural goal in designing mechanisms for auctions and public projects is to maximize the social welfare while incentivizing players to bid truthfully. If these are the only concerns, the problem is easily solved by use of the VCG mechanism. Unfortunately, this mechanism is not computationally efficient in general and there are currently no other general methods for designing truthful mechanis...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the ACM
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0004-5411,1557-735X
DOI: 10.1145/2908735