Optimal Loss Financing Under Bonus-Malus Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ASTIN Bulletin
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0515-0361,1783-1350
DOI: 10.2143/ast.31.1.1000