Optimal Law Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corruption and optimal law enforcement
We analyze corruption in law enforcement: the payment of bribes to enforcement agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them, and the actual framing of innocent individuals. Bribery, extortion, and framing reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly, extortion should not be sanctio...
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When cost is private information in the Brander{Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak ̄rm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that polic...
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We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost. We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optima...
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In the supply-chain literature, an increasing body of work studies how suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers’ ordering behaviour, thus reducing the supplier’s (and the total supply chain’s) costs. Various functional forms for such incentive schemes have been proposed, but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information abo...
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This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter’s concern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point for the negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, it is shown that transfers from the victim induce the polluting country to exaggerate its concern for the environment....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.199055