Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

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Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

1 Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information can create adverse selection and undermine market efficiency. Economic and legal institutions, such as auditors, underwriters, accountants, or used-car dealers, often emerge to limit adverse selection and allow markets to function. As a result, direct government interventions are usually unnecessary. If a market does collapse, however—presumably...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review

سال: 2012

ISSN: 0002-8282

DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.1