Optimal inspection for randomly triggered hidden deterioration processes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Periodic Inspection Programs for Randomly Failing Equipment
There have been many analyses made of models for equipment inspection, i. e ., where a system may suffer a bre.akdowfl, ~ut such an event is only discovered by an inspection. Most analyses as· ~ume t~at the tIme to failure follows a negative exponential law which implies that only periodic mspectlOn programs need b~ considered. Another model which has been analyzed by Barlow, Hunter, and Prosch...
متن کاملBridge Inspection for Decay and Other Deterioration
Wood is an amazing combination of polymers that exhibits both strength and durability as a structural material. Nevertheless, from the time it is formed in the tree, wood is subject to deterioration by a variety of agents. Damage ranges from relatively minor discolorations caused by fungi or chemicals to more serious decay and insect attack. Wood degradation is beneficial in the ecosystem, retu...
متن کاملOptimal Inspection and Replacement Policy using Stochastic Method for Deterioration Prediction
This paper introduces a Weibull hazard model formulated by the aggregated Markov method to forecast the expected life length of highway facilities and equipments and the inspection/replacement processes of tunnel lighting systems. First, the paper focuses on presenting a methodology to overcome the estimation bias issues caused by the incompleteness of the data set due to the lack of full life ...
متن کاملEconomic-Statistical Design of a Control Chart for High Yield Processes When the Inspection is Imperfect
CCC-r control chart is a monitoring technique for high yield processes. It is based on the analysis of the number of inspected items until observing a specific number of defective items. One of the assumptions in implementing CCC-r chart that has a significant effect on the design of the control chart is that the inspection is perfect. However, in reality, due to the multiple reasons, the...
متن کاملOptimal Dynamic Inspection
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may pro t by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on at most one agent in each period, in icting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We ch...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quality and Reliability Engineering International
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0748-8017,1099-1638
DOI: 10.1002/qre.2707