منابع مشابه
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
We analyse a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk-neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers’ valuations. Our main result is that in the expected revenue-maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available all the information that she can, and her e...
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Information about queue length is an important parameter for customers who face the decision whether to join a queue or not. In this paper, we study how optimal information disclosure policies can be used by a service provider of an M/M/1 queue to increase its revenue. Our main contribution is showing that the intuitive policy of informing customers about the current queue length when it is sho...
متن کاملOn the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure
We consider a revenue maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyers’ valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The seller therefore has information about buyers’ valuations that is not common knowledge. How will the seller di...
متن کاملOptimal Disclosure of Costly Information Packages in Auctions∗
In an independent, private values, second-price auction with entry fees we discuss the way in which a seller should optimally spread costly information among the bidders. We find that marginal gross revenues do not generally behave monotonically in total information release. In the two bidder case, essentially, any asymmetric allocation of information dominates the symmetric information allocat...
متن کاملOptimal Design of Internal Disclosure
This paper studies the joint design of optimal incentive pay and information disclosure in a dynamic moral hazard problem. The principal is more informed about the outcomes of agent’s actions and actively manages information available to the agent. Sharing information with the agent increases productivity (for example, allowing a better allocation of resources or effort), but increases the cost...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/657922