Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more improves efficiency of allocation but creates higher rents for bidders. disclosure policy that maximizes revenue is to fully reveal low values (where competition high) pool high low). size determined by critical quantile independent distribution and only dependent on number discuss how this provides rationale conflation digital advertising. (JEL D44, D82, D83, M37)
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The American economic review
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2640-205X', '2640-2068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210504