Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1986264