Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te3130