Optimal Green Operation and Information Leakage Decisions under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

This study investigated optimal green operation and information leakage decisions in a supply chain system. The system consists of one supplier, leader retailer 1, follower 2, the government. In this system, government subsidizes each based on selling price product. supplier is subject to yield uncertainty process. suppler decides whether leak 1′s order quantity 2 or not. study, we first built Stackelberg game address equilibrium decisions, when has not behavior, respectively. Subsequently, identify supplier’s how such behavior affects retailers’ ex ante profits, consumer surplus, social welfare through numerical study. Interestingly, obtained following results: (1) Supplier leaks are unique supplier. product’s degree wholesale at higher under than no leakage. (2) good for 1 bad 2. (3) Information increases both surplus certain conditions. (4) general, key parameters (e.g., subsidy rate, uncertainty, correlation, forecast accuracies) positively correlate with same direction, while they affect 2′s profit opposite direction. These findings provide useful insights businesses manage demand make level product management.