Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment

Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment

a r t i c l e i n f o We introduce limited commitment into a standard optimal fiscal policy model in small open economies. We consider the problem of a benevolent government that signs a risk-sharing contract with the rest of the world, and that has to choose optimally distortionary taxes on labor income, domestic debt and international transfers. Both the home country and the rest of the world...

Optimal Fiscal Policy and Amplification in a Small Open Economy∗

We study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy characterized by two main frictions – incomplete financial markets and an inability of the government to commit to policy. Our main contribution is to show that in this environment, the best sustainable policy can amplify and prolong shocks to output. In particular, the government’s credibility not to expropriate foreign capital endogenousl...

Efficient Expropriation: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

We study a small open economy characterized by two empirically important frictions – incomplete financial markets and an inability of the government to commit to policy. We characterize the best sustainable fiscal policy and show that it can amplify and prolong shocks to output. In particular, even when the government is completely benevolent, the government’s credibility not to expropriate cap...

Efficient expropriation: Sustainable fiscal policy in a small open economy

Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

We study a small open economy characterized by two main frictions – incomplete financial markets and an inability of the government to commit to policy. We characterize the best sustainable fiscal policy and show that it can prolong shocks to output. In particular, the government’s credibility not to expropriate capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy and may be “scarcest” dur...