Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1062-9769
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2009.09.005