Optimal Executive Compensation Dispersion and Product Market Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2164-5167,2164-5175
DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2018.89135