Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90052-7