Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

A dynamic mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional private information is studied. There is one object and two buyers who arrive in two different periods. In addition to his privately known valuation, the first buyer also has a privately known deadline for purchasing the object. The seller wants to maximize revenue. Depending on the type distribution, the incentive compatibility constrai...

متن کامل

Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism

Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2012-02-064 1 Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual Pivot Mechanism Sham Kakade Ilan Lobel Hamid Nazerzadeh Microsoft Research, New York University and University of Southern California [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Appendix Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3 Lemma A.1 For any reportin...

متن کامل

Lex-Optimal Multiclass Scheduling with Deadlines

A new optimality criterion and associated scheduling and dropping algorithm are presented for multiclass packets with deadlines. Equal length packets with deadlines and priority labels are either scheduled by their deadlines or dropped on or possibly before their deadlines. An L-bit priority label is used to handle up to 2 priority classes. A scheduling policy is called lex-optimal within the c...

متن کامل

Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines

This paper analyzes bargaining outcomes when agents do not have stationary time preferences (as represented by a constant discount factor) but are pressed by firm deadlines. We consider a dynamic model where traders with heterogeneous deadlines are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. A trader leaves the market when an agreement has been reached or...

متن کامل

Non-Optimal Mechanism Design

The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments—like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising—is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algo...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2016

ISSN: 0022-0531

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.007