Optimal dynamic mechanism design via a virtual VCG mechanism

Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism

Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2012-02-064 1 Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual Pivot Mechanism Sham Kakade Ilan Lobel Hamid Nazerzadeh Microsoft Research, New York University and University of Southern California [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Appendix Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3 Lemma A.1 For any reportin...

Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism∗

This paper studies shill bidding in the VCG mechanism applied to combinatorial auctions. Shill bidding is a strategy whereby a single decision-maker enters the auction under the guise of multiple identities (Sakurai et al. 1999). I formulate the problem of optimal shill bidding for a bidder who knows the aggregate bid of her opponents. A key to the analysis is a subproblem–the cost minimization...

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

A dynamic mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional private information is studied. There is one object and two buyers who arrive in two different periods. In addition to his privately known valuation, the first buyer also has a privately known deadline for purchasing the object. The seller wants to maximize revenue. Depending on the type distribution, the incentive compatibility constrai...

Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport Citation

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [4], as long as each bidder’s type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently s...

Uniqueness of the VCG Mechanism