Optimal districting with endogenous party platforms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.008