Optimal design for probit choice models with dependent utilities

Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities

The existence of truthful social choice mechanisms strongly depends on whether monetary transfers are allowed. Without payments there are no truthful, non-dictatorial mechanisms under mild requirements, whereas the VCG mechanism guarantees truthfulness along with welfare maximization when there are payments and utility is quasi-linear in money. In this paper we study mechanisms in which we can ...

Collective Choice with Linear Utilities

This note considers a property, called “limited shared weak preferences” (LSWP), in the context of a model with linear utility functions defined on a polyhedron of alternatives. As special cases, we capture the distributive politics model with externalities in consumption, and we capture collective choice of lotteries by expected utility-maximizing agents. We give a simple sufficient condition ...

Social Choice for General Utilities

Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism truthfully implements the value-maximizing choices, assuming agents’ utilities are quasi-linear in money. We study social choice with payments where utilities are non-quasi-lin...

Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities

Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism implements the value-maximizing choice, and has many other good properties: it is strategy-proof, onto, deterministic, individually rational, and does not make positive t...

Utilities , Preferences and Choice