Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contract Theory for Incentive Mechanism Design in Cooperative Relaying Networks
Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2090-0147,2090-0155
DOI: 10.1155/2015/690807