Optimal congestion pricing with diverging long-run and short-run scheduling preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium at a Bottleneck when Long- Run and Short-Run Scheduling Preferences diverge
We consider equilibrium and optimum use of a Vickrey road bottleneck, distinguishing between long-run and short-run scheduling preferences in an otherwise stylized scheduling model. The preference structure reflects that there is a distinction between the (exogenous) ’long-run preferred arrival time’, which would be relevant if consumers were unconstrained in the scheduling of their activities,...
متن کاملThe Short and Long Run Causality between Agglomeration and Productivity
This study is to investigate the short- and long-run causal relationship between agglomeration (localization and urbanization) economies and labor productivity in the manufacturing sector of 28 Iranian provinces over an 11-year period, 2001–2011. Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method was used to estimate our long-run panel data model. The empirical findings suggested that localiz...
متن کاملShort and Long Run Uncertainty Short and Long Run Uncertainty
Uncertainty appears to have both a short-run and a long-run component, which we measure using rm and macro implied volatility data from options of 30 days to 10 years duration. We ask what may be driving uncertainty over these di erent time horizons, nding that oil price volatility is particularly important for short-run uncertainty, policy uncertainty is particularly important for long-run unc...
متن کاملEfficiency and Observability with Long-run and Short-run Players
We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as 5 -> 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and shortrun players, allowing for the possibility that the players' actions are not observable by their opponents. We illustrate the algorithm with two economic examples. In a simple partnership we show how to compute the equilibrium payoffs when...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with longand short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the defini...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0191-2615
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2020.02.009