Optimal collusion with internal contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal collusion with internal contracting
In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.005