Optimal Capital Taxation for Time-Nonseparable Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences
Fundamental to any theory of capital taxation is a description of individual savings behavior. Successful descriptions of savings behavior have often resorted to the habit formation hypothesis. This paper studies the effect of habit formation on optimal capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrleesian model. We make three distinct contributions. First, we decompose intertemporal wedges (implicit capital ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2235171