Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multislot Sponsored Search Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions
We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations, restricting the strategies to several in a class of greedy bidding strategies introduced by Cary et al. We show that a particular convergent strategy, “balanced bidding”, also exhibits high stability to deviations in the dynamic setting. On the other hand, a cooperative strategy which yiel...
متن کاملMarketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions
The transition of the advertisement market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions used to sell advertisement space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this undermines both revenues and efficiency of both the generalized second pric...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions Capturing Constraints in Sponsored Search
Most sponsored search auctions use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) rule. Given the GSP rule, they try to give an optimal allocation, an easy task when the only need is to allocate ads to slots. However, when other practical conditions must be fulfilled –such as budget constraints, exploration of the performance of new ads, etc.– optimal allocations are hard to obtain. We provide a method to ...
متن کاملP APERS UNDER R EVIEW * Optimal Bidding in Multi - Item Multi - Slot Sponsored
s of Selected Papers Platform or Wholesale: Channel Structures in Electronic Retail (job market paper) Recent innovations in e-commerce have lead to the emergence of platforms, which manufacturers can use to directly reach out to customers. In this paper we analyze under what market conditions etailers should set up platforms instead of entering a more conventional reseller agreement with manuf...
متن کاملSimple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multiitem multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have additive valuations and are from the same population. Second, every bidder’s value distributions of items are independent but not necessarily identical monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions. For non-i.i.d. bidders,...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2013.1187