Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
P APERS UNDER R EVIEW * Optimal Bidding in Multi - Item Multi - Slot Sponsored
s of Selected Papers Platform or Wholesale: Channel Structures in Electronic Retail (job market paper) Recent innovations in e-commerce have lead to the emergence of platforms, which manufacturers can use to directly reach out to customers. In this paper we analyze under what market conditions etailers should set up platforms instead of entering a more conventional reseller agreement with manuf...
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In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities μij associ...
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In recent years, effective sponsored search auctions (SSAs) have been designed to incentivize advertisers (advs) to bid their truthful valuations and, at the same time, to assure both the advs and the auctioneer a non–negative utility. Nonetheless, when the click–through–rates (CTRs) of the advs are unknown to the auction, these mechanisms must be paired with a learning algorithm for the estima...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1544580