Optimal bailouts, bank’s incentive and risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Finance
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1614-2446,1614-2454
DOI: 10.1007/s10436-019-00346-z