Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Constructive Ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
15 Donor Conditionality and Policy
My focus is on the use by aid donor agencies of conditionality to induce changes in economic policies and institutions. At the most general level, this throws light on whether it is feasible to use donor leverage to overcome weak institutions and anti-reformist governments – whether it is possible to use this as a device for prevailing over domestic political constraints on the adoption of bett...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.199054