Optimal allocation without transfer payments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal allocation without transfer payments
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a di¢ cult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is ben...
متن کاملOptimal Allocation without Transfer Payments1
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a di¢ cult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is ben...
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This is a somewhat mechanistic (and simplistic) exegesis of the production-distribution linkage. However, it is one with profound implications for public policy. What it suggests, particularly where collective action is concerned, is the possibility of a social “taking” of wealth (or income) from some to be then disbursed to others considered to be more deserving. According to Mill, such a redi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.006