Optimal Allocation Without Money: An Engineering Approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money
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Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a di¢ cult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is ben...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2428449