Ontology and Attention: Addressing the Challenge of the Amoralist through Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology and Care Ethics

This paper addresses the persistent philosophical problem posed by amoralist—one who eschews moral values—by drawing on complementary resources within phenomenology and care ethics. How is it that amoralist can reject ethical injunctions serve general good be unpersuaded intuitions for most would require neither explanation nor justification? And more generally, what basis motivation? Why we others? What are underpinning ontological structures able to support an ethics of care? To respond these questions, I draw work Merleau-Ponty, focusing specifically his analyses perceptual attention. nature quality attention underwrite our capacities or incapacities proceed in dialogue with a range philosophers attuned compelling care, some have also drawn Merleau-Ponty others examined roots inspired incited other thinkers.