Online pricing for bundles of multiple items
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Online pricing for bundles of multiple items
Given a seller with k types of items, m of each, a sequence of users {u1, u2, . . .} arrive one by one. Each user is single-minded, i.e., each user is interested only in a particular bundle of items. The seller must set the price and assign some amount of bundles to each user upon his/her arrival. Bundles can be sold fractionally. Each ui has his/her value function vi (·) such that vi (x) is th...
متن کاملOnline Pricing for Multi-type of Items
In this paper, we study the problem of online pricing for multi-type items. Given a seller with k types of items where the amount of each type is m, a sequence of users {u1, u2, ...} arrive one by one. Each user is single-minded, i.e., each user is only interested in a particular bundle of items. The seller must set the unit price and assign some amount of bundles to each user upon his/her arri...
متن کاملTitle Online pricing for multi-type of Items
In this paper, we study the problem of online pricing for multi-type items. Given a seller with k types of items where the amount of each type is m, a sequence of users {u1, u2, ...} arrive one by one. Each user is single-minded, i.e., each user is only interested in a particular bundle of items. The seller must set the unit price and assign some amount of bundles to each user upon his/her arri...
متن کاملOn pricing of multiple bundles of products and services
This paper considers the pricing decision faced by a seller of bundles composed of a service and an associated product offered to customers on a subscription basis using a two-part tariff scheme. An optimal pricing policy that maximizes the profit of a firm is obtained using a dynamic programming approach and it is found that, in the long run, there is an optimal number of customers associated ...
متن کاملPricing Identical Items
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer’s information and agents’ valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative pow...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Global Optimization
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0925-5001,1573-2916
DOI: 10.1007/s10898-013-0043-4