Online auctions and generalized secretary problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Generalized Secretary Problems
This paper is composed of two related parts. In the first, we present a dynamic programming procedure for finding optimal policies for a class of sequential search problems that includes the well-known “secretary problem.” In the second, we propose a stochastic model of choice behavior for this class of problems and test the model with two extant data sets. We conclude that the previously repor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGecom Exchanges
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1551-9031,1551-9031
DOI: 10.1145/1399589.1399596