ONE-SELLER/TWO-BUYER MARKETS WITH BUYER EXTERNALITIES AND (IM)PERFECT COMPETITION
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
One-Seller/Two-Buyer Markets with Buyer Externalities and (im)Perfect Competition
In this paper the one-seller/two-buyer problem with buyer externalities is investigated under the assumption that the two buyers have legal opportunities to cooperate. It is shown that the Competitive equilibrium and the Core are robust with respect to negligible externalities and that the range of market prices in the Core belongs to range of Competitive equilibrium prices. However, these conc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198902000616